

# Online Crime and Security Economics

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# “Traditional” view of computer security

(from my intro. security class)

- Attackers are
  - Bound by computational and mathematical limitations...
  - ... but by little else
  - High expertise assumed

## Active attackers

- Or, what can Mallory do?
  - Can eavesdrop on all protocol runs
  - Can **replay** messages at will
  - Can **inject** fabricated messages in the network
    - For instance fabricated from pieces of old messages
  - Can **modify** a principal's message
  - Can **initiate multiple parallel protocol sessions**
  - Can perform **dictionary attack** on passwords
  - Can perform **exhaustive attack** on non-random (or poorly random) nonce



- Sound security engineering shouldn't rest on assumptions about possible attacker's weaknesses
- Likewise, defenders are assumed to be security-conscious

# Security in practice



VS



# Security in practice



VS



# (Most) attackers in practice

- Most security attacks carried out by entities that are
  - Financially interested
  - Economically rational
  - Not necessarily overly sophisticated
- Heavily reliant on commoditization
  - Purchase “services” from others



(Exception: the (still fairly rare) nation-state actors that are not outsourcing to criminals)

- Defenders (end-users) are also subject to biases, lack of interest, ...  
→ story for a different talk

# Research agenda

- **Understanding incentives of attackers and targets are critical to improving online security**
  - Useful to find where to target attackers
  - Useful to find how to deploy defenses
- How to discover and model these incentives?
- **Security analytics:** Assortment of different techniques
  - Game theory
  - Machine learning
  - **Network measurements**
  - Behavioral economics

# Question

- How can we model attacker behavior?
- Attackers usually not keen on being interviewed
- Modeling based on utility assumptions needs to be grounded in empirical evidence
- ...however...
- Online attackers leave **lots** of data for us to analyze

# Relevant papers (case studies)

- Online sale of prescription drugs
  1. Leontiadis, Moore and Christin. Measuring and analyzing search-redirection attacks in the illicit online prescription trade. [USENIX Security 2011](#)
  2. Leontiadis, Moore and Christin. A nearly four-year longitudinal study of search-engine poisoning. [ACM CCS 2014](#)
  3. Leontiadis, Moore and Christin. Pick Your Poison: Pricing and Inventories at Unlicensed Online Pharmacies. [ACM EC 2013](#)
- Online anonymous markets
  1. Christin. Traveling the Silk Road: A measurement study of a large anonymous online marketplace. [WWW'13](#)
  2. Soska and Christin. Measuring the longitudinal evolution of the online anonymous marketplace ecosystem. [USENIX Security 2015](#)


# Case study: Online sale of drugs

- One of the best known illicit online trades
  - Who hasn't received email spam for prescription drugs?




- Potentially most dangerous form of online crime
  - Wrong dosage can kill: cf. Ryan Haight
- Complex supply chain that can tell us a lot about the online criminal ecosystem


# Supply chain: high-level overview



# Supply chain: high-level overview



# Advertising unlicensed drugs



# Evolution of advertising of illicit products

Email spam has been the primary vector for a long time

Very low conversion rate\*  
(about 1 purchase every  
12.5 million emails sent for  
Rx)

Unsolicited

More recently: social network spam (e.g. Twitter)

Better conversion rate\*  
(Twitter spam: 0.13%)  
Posting malicious links via  
compromised accounts  
Exploiting trust  
relationships


Search engine manipulation

Targeted to users looking  
for a product  
Probably better  
conversion rates


\*Ratio of realized sales over the  
number of emails/clicks

# Search-redirection


[LMC, USENIX Security 2011]




# Attack modus operandi: Malware logic




# Attack modus operandi: Malware logic



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# Attack modus operandi: Malware logic

Incoming traffic

The screenshot displays a website interface with a header containing several product links. Below the header, there is a sidebar on the left with an 'Email Subscribe' form and an 'Upcoming Events' section. The main content area is titled 'Recent Stories' and lists several articles related to pharmaceutical products. At the bottom, there is a small section with more links.

**Header Links:**

- viagra Homeforum use
- viagra herbal for women
- canadian cialis com
- viagra ordering online australia
- kamagra sildenafil citrate tablet
- free cialis samples canada
- viagra ireland herbal
- cialis online canada online pharmacy

**Email Subscribe Form:**

- Name:
- E-mail:
- ☒ Receive HTML?
- Subscribe

**Upcoming Events:**

- buy cialis online
- online viagra
- cialis sale cebu
- viagra review online buy
- cialis generic overnight delivery


**Recent Stories:**

- Kamagra oral jelly tablets
- Cialis use with food
- Pharmacy cialis generic
- Kamagra international orders
- Levitra online from canada
- Cialis rate india
- What does a levitra pill look like
- Viagra alternatives over the counter uk
- Levitra professional india
- Propecia tablet for hair
- Viagra from tesco pharmacy


**Bottom Section:**

- viagra review online buy
- cialis generic overnight delivery
- Propecia tablet for hair
- Viagra from tesco pharmacy


# Attack modus operandi: Malware logic




# Attack modus operandi: Malware logic




# Attack modus operandi: Malware logic



# Attack modus operandi: Malware logic




# Attack modus operandi: Redirection chains



# Questions

- How has this attack evolved?
  - Volume and impact: Does this even matter?
  - Techniques
- Why has the attack evolved?
  - Effectiveness of the defenses?
- Can this be thwarted?
  - Legal intervention vs. technical defenses

# Data collection process



# Datasets collected

[LMC USENIX Security 2011, CCS 2014]

- Dataset 1
  - Aggregate results only
  - Rank of the results unknown
  - Mapping query-results unknown
- Dataset 2
  - Same as Dataset 1, but ranking information known
  - Mapping query-result doesn't include rank
- Dataset 3
  - All information is captured
  - ... but new Google API (slightly) limits results returned

Dataset	1	2	3
Period	4/12/10-11/15/10	11/15/10-10/8/11	10/8/11-9/16/13
Search results/query	64	64	16/32
Total results	260,824	3,609,675	1,530,099
Unique URLs	150,955	189,023	122,382
Unique domains	25,182	36,557	30,881

This is 3.5 years worth of data!

# Some of the 218 queries used

vicodin no prescription

cheap valium non prescription

buy ativan online injecting pills

buy xanax valium online florida

order vicodin si levitra online

buy xanax valium online florida

color of adipex pills safest place to buy online

vicodin without prescription

generic cialis free sample

cheap tadalafil

20 mg ambien overdose

prozac side effects


ambien buy online

alprazolam online without prescription buy cheap

Type	Count	Percent
Malicious (Black)	26	22%
Benign (White)	75	34%
Ambiguous (Gray)	117	54%
Total	218	100%

# Long-term evolution

[LMC CCS 2014]



G1: Google changes search ranking algorithm


G2: Google starts removing query info from "Referer" field

G3: Google is done deploying Referer modifications

B1, B2, B3 : Firefox, Safari, Chrome switch to HTTPS-only search

(C1, C2: major changes to our collection infrastructure)


# Uncovering relationships in search results



*Idea: Connected components in the graph evidence "some" level of business relationships between the nodes they connect*


# Connected components

- 34 connected components
- One connected component contains
  - 96% of all infected domains
  - 90% of all redirection domains
  - 92% of all pharmacies
- Is one person responsible for all of this?!




# Connected components

- 34 connected components
- One connected component contains
  - 96% of all infected domains
  - 90% of all redirection domains
  - 92% of all pharmacies
- Is one person responsible for all of this?!
  - **NO!**
  - Some advertisers work for several different affiliate networks
  - Certain domains are (ab)used by multiple advertisers




# Identifying the main players

- Run (spinglass) clustering algorithm in big connected component
- Each cluster represented by different color
- Evidence of separate organized groups/campaigns more loosely connected to each other
  - About 10-12 large groups




# Illicit advertising infrastructure

- Traffic brokers are disproportionately hosted on **very few** networks



# Procuring unlicensed drugs



# Inventory analysis [LMC, 2013]



# Data collected

- Scraped for prices and inventories:
  - 265 unlicensed pharmacies (doing search-redirection attacks) collected between April 3, 2012 and October 16, 2012
  - 265 “blacklisted” pharmacies
    - Randomly sampled out of a corpus of 9000+ NABP “not recommended” pharmacies
    - No overlap with the unlicensed pharmacy corpus

# Scraping

**CANADIAN Health&Care Mall**

ALL PRODUCTS | ABOUT US | HOW TO ORDER | TESTIMONIALS | FAQ | CONTACTS

Search

Your Cart: Items: 0 | Total: \$0.00

USD GBP CAD EUR AUD CHF

**MEN'S HEALTH**

- Viagra ★
- Cialis ★
- Viagra Super Active+ ★
- Levitra ★
- Viagra Professional ★
- Viagra Super Force ★
- Cialis Super Active+ ★
- Cialis Professional ★
- Cialis Soft Tabs ★
- Viagra Soft Tabs ★
- Propecia ★
- Super Active ED Pack
- VPXL
- [View all products](#)

Product	Description	Testimonials	Order Now
Viagra 200mg pills:	20 pills 200mg + FREE BONUS PILLS	<del>\$166.67</del> 10% discount \$150.00 \$7.50 per item	Order now
Viagra 150mg pills:	20 pills 150mg + FREE BONUS PILLS	<del>\$166.67</del> 10% discount \$139.80 \$6.99 per item	Order now
Viagra 130mg pills:	20 pills 130mg + FREE BONUS PILLS	<del>\$166.67</del> 10% discount \$127.00 \$6.35 per item	Order now

Drug name/product  
(subsequently  
mapped to active  
ingredient/condition)

Quantity

Dosage

Price

Total = 1,451,587 distinct (drug, active ingredient, dosage, unit) tuples collected  
1,661 different drug names

# Identifying common suppliers: Inventory overlap

- How much overlap is there between distinct unlicensed pharmacies' inventories?

- Jaccard distance:

$$J_{\delta}(A, B) = 1 - \frac{|A \cap B|}{|A \cup B|}$$

Inventory of pharmacy  $\mathcal{A}$


Inventory of pharmacy  $\mathcal{B}$

- Identical inventories  $\Leftrightarrow J_{\delta}(A, B) = 0$
- No overlap at all  $\Leftrightarrow J_{\delta}(A, B) = 1$


# Clustering inventories

- Inventory  $A$  and Inventory  $B$  belong to the same cluster iff  $J_\delta(A, B) < t$ 
  - $t$  is an arbitrary threshold,  $0 < t < 1$
- Distance between two groups of inventories  $X, Y$ :
  - Minimum linkage:  $J_\delta(X, Y) = \min\{J_\delta(x, y) : x \in X, y \in Y\}$
  - Maximum linkage:  $J_\delta(X, Y) = \max\{J_\delta(x, y) : x \in X, y \in Y\}$
  - Average linkage:  $J_\delta(X, Y) = \frac{1}{|X| \cdot |Y|} \sum_{x \in X} \sum_{y \in Y} J_\delta(x, y)$


# Clustering inventories: Average linkage, $t=0.31$



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
# Clustering inventories: Average linkage, $t=0.31$



# Intervening, or: what does the analysis tell us

- High concentration in traffic brokers
  - Orders of magnitude less numerous than pharmacies and infected hosts
  - Mostly hosted on same networks
  - Structure hasn't changed much over four years
  - Opportunities for takedowns seem ripe
    - Jurisdiction issues?
- High concentration in suppliers (labs)
  - Of strong interest to manufacturers...

# Evolution of illicit Internet commerce



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL <http://menshealth-pharmacy.com/cialis.html>. The page features a navigation bar with links: Order Status, Products, Shipping, How To Order, Policies, Guarantees, and Contact Us. A sidebar on the left lists various products under the heading "OUR PRODUCTS", including Viagra, Brand Viagra, Viagra Soft, Viagra Professional, Viagra Super Active, Viagra with Dapoxetine, Viagra Gold, **Cialis**, Brand Cialis, Cialis Soft, Cialis Professional, Cialis Super Active, Cialis with Dapoxetine, Cialis Black, Levitra, Brand Levitra, Kamagra Oral Jelly, and ED Trial Pack. The main content area displays a large banner for Cialis with a couple's photo and text: "GUARANTEED SATISFACTION & 10% OFF FOR ALL REORDERS". To the right of the banner, there is a red box stating "USA to USA Priority Mail DELIVERY" and a blue box saying "CHECK YOUR ORDER ONLINE". Below the banner, the "PRODUCTS" section shows a list of letters (A-Z) and a search bar. The detailed view of "Cialis (Generic)" includes a yellow pill image, a description: "Cialis is used to treat erectile dysfunction. It works by helping to increase blood flow into the penis during sexual stimulation, and helps you to achieve and maintain an erection. Cialis relaxes muscles and increases blood flow to particular areas of the body.", and a synonym: "Tadalafil". The dosage "20mg" is also indicated. At the bottom, a table header is visible with columns: Quantity, Per Pill, Price, Reorder Price, and Bonus.

# Evolution of illicit Internet commerce

Browser address: [silkroadvb5piz3r.onion/silkroad](http://silkroadvb5piz3r.onion/silkroad)










messages 0 | orders 0 | account \$0.00

**Silk Road**  
anonymous market

Search  Go

Shop by Category

- Drugs 11,247
  - Cannabis 2,664
  - Dissociatives 269
  - Ecstasy 1,262
  - Opioids 667
  - Other 551
  - Precursors 102
  - Prescription 2,447
  - Psychedelics 1,213
  - Stimulants 1,551
- Apparel 341
- Art 3
- Biotic materials 2
- Books 912
- Collectibles 14
- Computer equipment 74
- Custom Orders 89
- Digital goods 630
- Drug paraphernalia 330
- Electronics 103
- Erotica 626
- Fireworks 15
- Food 9
- Forgeries 158
- Hardware 27
- Herbs & Supplements 11
- Home & Garden 11
- Jewelry 90
- Lab Supplies 53
- Lotteries & games 53
- Medical 44

 Royal Customers 10G \$1.66	 Decanoate250, (1 x 10ml = 2.500mg) \$0.39	 XTC Pills MDMA 175mg x500 \$19.28
 100g Dimethoxbenzaldehyde \$1.45	 LECKERMAN WEEKLY SKUNK IS BACK STRONG \$0.52	 Good Quality Soap Bar   126g(4.5oz)   UK Vendor \$2.78
 Modafinil 200mg - 300 Pills \$2.65	 0.2g DMT Freebase \$0.48	 1g cocaine high premium quality FLEX - high grade \$1.32

# Case study:

## Online anonymous marketplaces

- Amazon.com of illegal goods
  - Drugs, CC's & Fake IDs, Weapons, etc.
  - No child pornography
- Safety
- Convenience
- Variety
- Accountability
- Competition

# Online anonymous marketplace technology

- Hidden Website (Tor Hidden Service, I2P)

- Customers

- No cost of creation
    - No information needed

- Vendors

- Vendor bonds required
    - Often invite only
    - Public feedback history



- Payments (Bitcoin)

- Marketplaces often act as escrow agent
  - Escrow sometimes acts as a mixing service



- Encrypted Messages(PGP)



# Questions

- How much is being sold?
- What is being sold?
- How many vendors are relevant?
- What are potentially successful interventions?

# Typical listing page

## Books

### Hacking for beginners

**Seller:**

**hackingtech (98)**

**Price:**

฿0.12

**Ships from:** undeclared

**Ships to:** Worldwide

#### Description:


Hacking For Beginners is a reference book for beginners to learn ethical hacking for free and from basic level to clear all the fundamental concepts of ethical hacking. the book has been prepared by Hacking Tech ( www.hackingtech.co.tv ) website for the users benefit. so enjoy the book and site...

**add to cart**

#### Recent feedback

rating	feedback	freshness
5 of 5	Fast delivery	3 days
5 of 5	Thanks!	4 days
5 of 5	Leave feedback here	9 days
5 of 5	Leave feedback here	9 days
5 of 5	5 of 5	10 days

**bookmark this item**



**Feedback is often mandatory!**

➔ Acceptable proxy for sales volume

# Measurements


- **Started collection in November 2011**
- **As of August 2015, we had collected**
  - 35 marketplaces
  - 1,908 scrapes total – 3.2 TB
  - 27 – 331,691 pages per scrape
- **Still collecting...**

# Data completeness

- **How complete is the data?**
  - Unreliable dynamic marketplaces that take days to scrape
  - Empirical observations – lower bound
- **Idea:** Estimate population via mark and recapture
  - Schnabel estimator allows multiple recapture


# Mark and recapture

Population Size = 24




# Mark and recapture

Sample Size = 10




# Mark and recapture

Sample Size = 13




# Mark and recapture

Overlap = 5, Population Estimate = 26



# Data completeness



# Analysis

- **Assumption:** Each feedback corresponds to precisely one transaction
  - Anonymity requires strictly enforced feedback system to establish reputation
  - Possible on many marketplaces to purchase several quantities of item and leave one feedback, conservative estimate

# Analysis challenges

- “Holding prices”
  - Came up with automated statistical filtering of outliers



\$0.02 -> \$1,000.00




\$1,100.00 -> \$1,000,000.00


# Analysis challenges

- Misleading product categories





- Define sixteen categories
- Designed special purpose classifier to infer which category each listing belongs to
  - Extract from tf-idf







*The ecosystem as a whole has been resilient to both takedowns and scams  
Targeting marketplace operators seems (relatively) ineffective*




# Item sales per category



# Vendor volumes



# Vendor volumes



# Summary

- Collect and analyze data to understand attacker ecosystem and develop better defenses
  - **Development of a science of measurement**
  - Emergence of concentrations
    - Traffic brokers & production labs in pharma, large sellers in narcotics...
    - **Driven by economic properties**
    - Possible intervention points
- Ongoing/future work
  - Using our data to build descriptive (mathematical) models of interactions that can then be used to predict future behavior

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